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Hazel Butz Carruth 
A FOREWORD 
Gene Wise has written, "Perspectives are the 'pictures in our heads' which 
compress our experience into controllable form."1 
The two essays in the monograph focus upon that highest form of expres­
sion, literature, and create new perspectives, new "pictures in our heads" re­
garding the poetry of Robert Frost and the general study of literary 
criticism. Taken together these two essays constitute a broad statement on 
perspectives in today's world, provide original insight into the ways of view­
ing important matters in the world of ideas, and suggest basic elements in­
herent in an understanding of both the modern world and its literature. 
Marjorie Cook and Lewis Sego range widely in American literature and 
literary criticism. Dr. Cook begins with a definition of Frost's modernism as 
it arises from what she calls the "modern vision, ... a balance of irony and 
imagination within a context of realism." She sees the present stance in this 
"Age of Irony" derived from three principles of the human condition: 
Change, Chance, and Finiteness. She pictures Frost moving beyond 
philosophic irony to "the leap of faith and commitment made possible in 
part by the imagination." She holds that "The imagination is the source of 
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insight, of creative thinking, of synthesizing particulars into wholes, pat­
terns." And she concludes, "Frost's playfulness includes this shrewdness 
about playfulness: he sees the irony of the ironic stance; he knows that belief 
is best. The awareness of potential irony, even total doubt in philosophic 
irony, and the affirmation of the imagination are balanced in Frost's modern 
vision." 
Dr. Sego develops for what he calls this current age of "how," a new, 
pluralistic philosophy called "perspectivism." Utilizing the visual image of a 
tetrahedron composed of marbles, he develops this idea: "Essentially, the 
philosophy of perspectivism says that the aspects of mankind's dual nature, 
intellectual and emotional, should harmonize and reinforce each other." It is 
this "internal consistency, a resolution of conflicts, and a harmonious 
balance among the opposing forces and seemingly opposing points of view" 
that is, in Dr. Sego's view, "The sole criterion for reality." 
In his view, "the ultimate law will be the law of love, perhaps a love that 
is so far beyond any that we have ever experienced as to amaze us." Thus the 
philosophy has implications not 'only in literary criticism but in society as 
well. "Ethically," he asserts, "perspectivism tests every act or decision by the 
simple test of balance and harmony." 
These two papers were read upon the occasion of the retirement from 
Taylor University of Hazel Butz Carruth. They were given as a part of "A 
Literary Symposium," November 2 and 3, 1978, sponsored by members of 
the Department of English of the University. This symposium included ad­
dresses and presentations by Daryl Adrian, Ball State University; Marjorie 
Elder, Marion College; Roy Battenhouse, Indiana University; Arthur 
Shumaker, DePauw University; George Clark, Hanover College; Phyllis 
Scherle, IUPU1, and Janet Watson Sheeran, Rockhurst (Kansas) College, as 
well as members of the Taylor University faculty and administration. 
This monograph, Perspectives: Limits and Possibilities, is presented as a 
tribute to Dr. Carruth by Taylor University, in loving gratitude for her 
devotion to her students, the University, and our Lord, demonstrated in a 
life of learning, scholarship, and teaching. She has, indeed, given guidance 
to and enhanced the perspectives of thousands through her life of service. 
'Gene Wise, American Historical Explanations (Homewood, 1L: The Dorsey Press, 1973), p. 36. 
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FROST'S MODERNISM: A MARRIAGE OF 
IRONY AND IMAGINATION 
MARJORIE COOK, Ph.D. 
Eliot's poetry and criticism defined 
modernism and determined taste for two 
generations after he published The Waste 
Land. Frost never did approve of that 
definition for modernism nor standard for 
taste and said so whenever he was asked— 
and sometimes when not asked. One of my 
colleagues always baits me by calling 
Frost "a nice little nineteenth-century 
nature poet." Somewhat in self-defense 
both Frost and I have pondered modern­
ism. In this paper I will be mainly con­
cerned with the case for Frost's modern­
ism in vision, though the case for his 
modernism in form and technique is fas­
cinating as well. 
The essence of the modern vision, I con­
clude, is a balance of irony and imagina­
tion within a context of realism. It is in 
their vision of balanced irony and imag­
ination that Frost and Eliot are most alike. 
Both are ironists, but not philosophical 
ironists. Both move beyond philosophical 
irony to the leap of faith and commitment 
made possible in part by the imagination. 
(Such belief is related to, but is not the 
same as, religious belief.) Philosophical 
irony is simply the principle of irony be­
come a philosophy, a way of viewing all 
of life. The principle of irony is the possi­
bility of unexpected reversals, whether in 
rhetoric or in life. Not all reversals are 
ironic, but those which are sharp con­
trasts to what is expected are ironic. The 
sharper the contrast, the greater the irony. 
In other words, not only does what is ex­
pected not happen, but also its opposite 
does happen: an unexpected and sharp 
contrast.1 
How did modern thinkers come to their 
particular balance of irony and imagina­
tion? To answer that, we must consider 
the world they inherited. Three principles 
of the human condition have always al­
lowed for ironic reversals—change, 
chance, and finiteness. The modern value 
which produced a prevalence of philo­
sophical irony was an overweaning de­
sire for absolute rational certainty and, 
by implication, for perfect rational or­
der. All should be as rationally expected. 
That desire ultimately led—over three 
centuries—to the conclusion that ration­
al certainty cannot exist in this world. 
The subjective perspective which Des­
cartes affirmed itself came to be doubted 
as solipsism, a prison of subjectivity de­
stroying all certainty. With that, gloom, 
despair, negation—philosophical irony 
—descended on the modern world. 
The three characteristics of this world 
which have always made possible ironic 
reversals, to repeat, are change, chance, 
and finiteness. First, the principle of 
process or change itself limits a person's 
certainty. People never have known the 
future—nor even the meanings and sig­
nificance of the present—nor of the past 
completely, despite their having reflected 
on it. Moreover, partly because the human 
•For more complete discussion of irony seeD. C. Muecke, 
The Compass of Irony (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd, 1969) 
and Wayne Booth, The Rhetoric of Irony (Chicago: Univer­
sity of Chicago Press, 1974). 
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being can choose among options, the 
results of change cannot be guaranteed, 
are not completely predictable. For in­
stance, the Romantics—to oversimplify 
for emphasis—had re-discovered that the 
world is dynamic, and they had valued 
organic growth, keeping a sense of the 
absolute in the ideal. The Victorians, 
having lost more of their sense of the ab­
solute in the ideal, wished to improve the 
view of a world-in-change with the cer­
tainty of perfectibility; the Realists and 
Naturalists, however, could not find 
proof of any perfectibility in their neigh­
bors' behavior—nor, confessed the great 
ones, could they find it in their own be­
havior. The Naturalists, in turn, saw a 
certainty in the Second Law of Thermo­
dynamics applied to history: everything 
was spending itself to nothingness, disin­
tegrating, degenerating. Rut to many 
modern authors the certainty of nihilism 
did not fit the facts of human experience 
either—Frost among them, as this paper 
will show. 
Second, the principle of chance, even 
more so than change, makes many, even 
most, of the predictions about life at best 
only probabilities—and many not even 
that. If one longs for rational order and 
perfection, the potential, unexpected 
reversals in the world seem absurd. Third, 
with the Realists and Naturalists, late-
nineteenth century thinkers emphasized 
human limits—one's finiteness and long­
ing for infiniteness, as well as one's spir­
itual infiniteness confined in a finite 
world. This emphasis on a person's desire 
to know and his inability to know for 
certain, his longing for immortality and 
his inevitable death, point up the uncer­
tainty, even absurdity, in the human 
condition. It should be noted, however, 
the human condition had not changed so 
much as had values, beliefs, and em­
phases. 
How did these principles and values 
produce a wave of philosophical irony if 
contingency and ambiguity had always 
been inherent in the human condition? 
Late nineteenth- and early twentieth-
century thinkers were not able to main­
tain the harmony the great Romantics 
had worked out for themselves between 
the idealistic, imaginative, rational per­
son and the dynamic, a-rational world. 
In part, people had lost their sense of the 
absolute, both in God and then in the 
perfect or perfectible machinery of the 
universe. Also, never before had so many 
people demanded scientific and math­
ematical proof for belief—and now de­
manded it because they needed some 
certainty. Under these circumstances, the 
uncertainty inherent in the human con­
dition becomes overwhelming because 
people can see nothing worthy enough 
and certain enough—for some that is the 
same thing—on which to base their faith. 
Idealizing the rational statement and 
knowing it always to be a hypothesis, the 
philosophical ironist doubts all rational 
statement. He will make no commitments 
because he cannot be sure that he is abso­
lutely right, that the truth he thinks he 
knows is really true or that the reality he 
thinks he perceives is truly real. He cannot 
see—nor leap—beyond this uncertainty, 
having only his intellect to aid him. Thus 
he is immobilized. 
Modern thinkers who wished to move 
beyond this immobilizing philosophical 
irony had to explore the implications of 
limited persons in a changing world in 
relation to the counter values of the more 
structured and static world of ideals. The 
modern dilemma is actually a perennial 
human problem, but one which becomes 
a crisis, especially in such an Age of Irony. 
How could one establish values, let alone 
embody them in significant form? Frost 
was among those "Poets of Reality"2 who 
worked through to a positive philosophy, 
to a commitment and faith again, beyond 
philosophical irony. Frost and these others 
2J. Hillis Miller in Poets of Reality (New York: Atheneum, 
1974) details the confrontation and movement beyond 
nihilism by six modern poets. 
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did not have the ironist's rational bias; 
Frost admitted that in matters philo­
sophical "A melancholy dualism is the 
only soundness," but then asked an un­
expected question: "The question is: Is 
soundness of the essence."3 That was the 
key to moving beyond total doubt. Philo­
sophical irony had reigned until poets and 
others found in the imagination the be­
ginning of a way out: a person's imagina­
tion is essential to his humanity; a person 
is more than a rational animal. Without 
replacing religion by poetry, Frost and 
others saw the imagination as basic to 
one's making the leap of faith and commit­
ment. 
The imagination is the source of in­
sight, of creative thinking, of synthesizing 
particulars into wholes, patterns. It is that 
which allows us to see beyond the narrow 
rationalism of deductive logic into the 
more expansive inductive logic which 
requires a leap in generalization and hy­
pothesizing. To see beyond the literal 
present always demands imagination, 
and nearly all thinking is metaphorical. 
This play of imagination, this mental 
agility, is essential in all insights, in seeing 
new relationships. Through such an­
alogical thinking people arrive at mean­
ings and synthesize meanings into patterns 
of values and philosophy. 
Certainly human knowledge is limited, 
but people must act. As Frost has Job say 
in A Masque of Reason, We don't know 
everything, but "we know well enough to 
go ahead with/I mean we seem to know 
enough to act on."4 We do venture into 
the unknown, positing premises, acting 
on probabilities. Frost's speaker usually 
is not defeated or embittered, considering 
himself a rational being thrown unfairly 
3Selected Prose of Robert Frost, edited by Hyde Cox 
and Edward Connery Lathem (New York: Holt, Rinehart 
and Winston, 1966), p. 112. Future references to this work 
will be in the text, designated SP. 
*The Poetry of Robert Frost, edited by Edward Connery 
Lathem (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969), 
p. 483. Future reference to this work will be in the text, 
designated PRF. 
(unfairly again revealing a bias for ratio­
nalism) into an a-rational world. He can 
create structures for meaning; he can 
even "escape" with his commitments, as 
in "I Could Give All to Time" (PRF, p. 
334). Frost and many of his speakers enjoy 
putting their skill, shrewdness, courage, 
wisdom, and luck to the test in what he 
likes to call a game "play[ed] for mortal 
stakes" (PRF, p. 277). Even knowing the 
inherent and inevitable potential for 
tragedy, Frost values the right to fail and 
the right to suffer as necessary possibilities 
for one to attain meaning in the human 
condition. 
What we have in our human condition 
is a world of appearances which must be 
interpreted to have meaning. No inter­
pretation is absolute; all interpretations 
depend upon imagination, point of view, 
and other subjective elements. While the 
imagination is necessary, reason and even 
a consciousness of philosophical irony are 
also essential. Interpretation, after all, 
involves both looking clearly at what is 
and positing reasonable theory. (In this, 
Frost is neither far from nor alienated 
from the sciences.) Frost keeps both imag­
ination and reason in a reasonableness. 
Consider, for instance, "A Roundless 
Moment": 
He halted in the wind, and—what was that 
Far in the maples, pale, but not a ghost? 
He stood there bringing M arch against his thought, 
And yet too ready to believe the most. 
"Oh, that's the Paradise-in-Bloom," I said; 
And truly it was fair enough for flowers 
Had we but in us to assume in March 
Such white luxuriance of May for ours. 
We stood a moment so, in a strange world, 
Myself as one his own pretense deceives; 
And then I said the truth (and we moved on). 
A young beech clinging to its last year's leaves, 
(p. 233-34) 
In the poem the first interpretation of the 
whiteness ahead is an illusion which does 
not fit the facts. The first character is right 
to "bring/March against his thought": 
the outer and inner worlds must be in 
harmony for a proper perspective on the 
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world. Poirier, in an otherwise excellent 
book, goes too far in calling this a poem 
praising the imagination in its boundless­
ness.3 He seems, in fact, to neglect the 
ending. The positiveness associated with 
imagination is overpowered at the end by 
the strength of one word—truth—and the 
power gained by that understatedness: 
the abruptness, the matter-of-fact and 
even casual tone at the end. In its under­
statedness, that last statement becomes 
the strongest, most positive assertion in 
the poem. The speaker's earlier words for 
accepting the illusions all have negative 
connotations: "Myself as one his own 
pretense deceives." Not all fictions are 
useful; the imagination in its unbound-
edness can be destructive, deceiving. 
In "A Boundless Moment," the pair, 
having realized and accepted the truth (if 
realized, it must be accepted), can move 
on, which is better than staying "in a 
strange world" with a false "luxuriance," 
an unrealistic dream. Moreso than 
Poirier's comment, John Lynen's comment 
on the poem keeps the balance between 
the value of the imagination and the pref­
erence of the actual over an unrealistic 
dream. Even more important, Lynen sees 
in the poet's acceptance of realistic 
boundedness an assertion of a person's 
spiritual being. (Perhaps that is the same 
truth Poirier comes at aslant.) 
The fading of a vision may be sad, but the truth­
fulness which will not take it too seriously has 
something noble about it. The speaker's refusal 
to accept anything but the truth, when the truth 
is disappointing, demonstrates the courage of 
man's intellect. 
Unflinching honesty in the face of facts is a 
recurrent theme in Frost's nature poetry. For it 
is in this that he sees the basis of man's power 
and indeed of his spiritual being. Man can never 
find a home in nature, nor can he live outside of 
it. But he can assert the reality of his spirit and 
thus can exist independently of the physical world 
in the act of looking squarely at the facts of 
nature.6 
'Richard Poirier, Robert Frost: The Work of Knowing, 
(NewYork: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 213-14. 
Not all situations are this clear. An ap­
pearance may have different and even 
opposing interpretations, and therein 
begin the problems, as people have always 
learned. The Puritans, along with their 
other trials, had to face this one as well: 
for instance, when lightning struck the 
minister's house, they asked what it meant, 
and their asking each other instead of the 
minister was a turning point in New En­
gland government. Was it a trial for the 
just or a warning to the wicked? The an­
swer depended in part on what you 
thought of the minister—and what you 
thought he thought of you—and you see 
how quickly it becomes very complicated. 
Frost knows the value and richness of 
ambiguity and would insist on it to keep 
his freedom to interpret, his right to in­
terpret. In the poem "On the Heart's 
Beginning to Cloud the Mind," the poet 
emphasizes that ambiguity is inherent in 
appearances, here heightened by the 
appearances being just the barest of frag­
ments, and he also asserts the ambiguity 
of the roles of reason and emotion—irony 
and imagination, if you will—in interpre­
tation. 
Something I saw or thought I saw 
In the desert at midnight in Utah, 
Looking out of my lower berth 
At moonlit sky and moonlit earth. 
The sky had here and there a star; 
The earth had a single light afar, 
A flickering, human pathetic light, 
That was maintained against the night, 
It seemed to me, by the people there, 
With a Godforsaken brute despair. 
It would flutter and fall in half an hour 
Like the last petal off a flower. 
But my heart was beginning to cloud my mind. 
I knew a tale of a better kind. 
That far light flickers because of trees. 
The people can burn it as long as they please; 
And when their interests in it end. 
They can leave it to someone else to tend. 
Come back that way a summer hence, 
I should find it no more no less intense. 
I pass, but scarcely pass no doubt, 
When one will say, "Let us put it out." 
The other without demur agrees. 
8John F. Lynen, The Pastoral Art of Robert Frost (New 
Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1963), pp. 151-
52. 
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They can keep it burning as long as they please; 
They can put it out whenever they please. 
One looks out last from the darkened room 
At the shiny desert with spots of gloom 
That might be people and are but cedar, 
Have no purpose, have no leader, 
Have never made the first move to assemble, 
And so are nothing to make her tremble. 
She can think of places that are not thus 
Without indulging a "Not for us!" 
Life is not so sinister-grave. 
Matter of fact has made them brave. 
He is husband, she is wife. 
She fears not him, they fear not life. 
They know where another light has been, 
And more than one, to theirs akin, 
But earlier out for bed tonight, 
So lost on me in my surface flight. 
This I saw when waking late, 
Going by at a railroad rate, 
Looking through wreaths of engine smoke 
Far into the lives of other folk. (p. 290-93) 
The poet emphasizes that appearances 
here are fragments, from which he draws 
enough facts for two possible interpreta­
tions. The opening statement is a sentence 
fragment, and the narrative framework 
shows that the incident is just a glimpse in­
to the distance. Finally, the last four lines 
are set off, emphasizing again the narra­
tive framework and the incident-as-frag-
ment. This ending seems to suggest that 
the fragmentary nature of the incident 
cannot lead to any final interpretation; 
we simply don't have enough evidence, 
and we've gained what was to be gained 
through speculating. The tone here shifts 
from the serious comic vision in the poem 
to the merely humorous in these last four 
lines, to mere word-play, although per­
haps wreathe, related to writhe, main­
tains the serious comic tone of the whole. 
This throw-away ending, which is char­
acteristic of Frost, usually gains ironic 
force from understatement, as in "A 
Boundless Moment," but here the throw-
away conclusion seems to accomplish 
simply that—to destroy the significance 
built carefully by the rest of the poem. 
The reader is returned to his own world 
and left to build his own significances 
from these appearances—and by implica­
tion, from appearances in his own ex­
perience. The reader must take what he 
knows, here and elsewhere, and interpret 
for himself. 
A more interesting ambiguity here is 
that of the roles of reason and emotion, 
irony and imagination, in interpreta­
tion. The important thirteenth line and 
title is quite obviously the crux of the po­
em. But is it the head or the heart which 
inclines toward a "Godforsaken brute 
despair" in the darker interpretation ex­
pressed in the first part of the poem in 
contrast to the more encouraging inter­
pretation detailed in the latter part? The 
darker view may be seen as coldly factu­
al and rational—reason in its narrow 
sense leading to philosophical irony—or 
the darker view may be seen as an undu­
ly) fearful imagination in "a boundless 
moment." The poem has been interpret­
ed both ways. Emphasizing the ambigui­
ty by repeating the line, the poet, I 
think, means to show the terms are false 
oppositions; one should interpret with 
both heart and mind. Interpretation in­
volves both looking clearly at what is 
and positing a reasonable theory—uti­
lizing with the best skill and insight, based 
on understanding and courage, both the 
rational and imaginative capacities. 
Many fears are groundless, but not all 
are. The worst possible tales may be true, 
but here they do not square with the prob­
abilities, the more reasonable view, based 
on the greater understanding. Here the 
more positive view, in contrast to that in 
"A Boundless Moment," fits what facts 
are known, and it also has the benefit of 
being encouraging, heartening. Encour­
aged, motivated to persist beyond what 
narrow reason alone might dictate, a per­
son can accomplish much that had not 
seemed possible at first. The flickering 
light does not necessarily signify the pa­
thetic state of humans; the "spots of gloom" 
are merely trees, after all. I wish to em­
phasize, however, the encouraging inter­
pretation the poet affirms here includes 
much discipline and toughness. Futile 
repeating, regretting, or dreaming is not 
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"indulged." Most significantly, the nar­
rator comments, "Matter of fact has made 
them brave." 
What Frost objects to is what he sees as 
the abuse of either reason or imagination— 
when either alone is offered as sufficient 
in itself for life. Imagination by itself may 
dwell unrealistically in "boundless mo­
ments." Intellect alone leads to irony, and 
Frost sees the irony of philosophical irony. 
But Frost will not easily dismiss reason; he 
has too much respect both for Yankee 
common sense and shrewdness and for the 
Greek Golden Mean. But intellect by it­
self, though it may produce great ration­
al systems, may also be unrealistic. It 
cannot predict the future with certainty 
nor give absolute answers to the great 
questions of human meaning. Frost is 
neither anti-science nor anti-philosophy, 
though he will remind us of the limits of 
both. More exactly, he is anti-systems; he 
sees too much systematizing both in sci­
ence and philosophy as an abuse and ex­
aggeration of reason, as assumption and 
a presumption that rational structure 
should be supreme. In any system, as any 
careful student knows, much variance 
will remain unexplained, and Frost in­
sists that that variance be acknowledged 
somehow. 
The ideal attitude in life seems a con­
scious and dynamic balance of reason and 
imagination, infused throughout with an 
awareness of potential irony. "Two Look 
at Two" shows a couple capable of both 
sense and sensibility, irony and imagina­
tion. 
Love and forgetting might have carried them 
A little further up the mountainside 
With night so near, but not much further up. 
They must have halted soon in any case 
With thoughts of the path back, how rough it was 
With rock and washout, and unsafe in darkness; 
When they were halted by a tumbled wall 
With barbed-wire binding. They stood facing this, 
Spending what onward impulse they still had 
In one last look the way they must not go, 
On up the failing path, where, if a stone 
Or earthslide moved at night, it moved itself; 
No footstep moved it. "This is all," they sighed, 
Good-night to woods." But not so; there was more. 
A doe from round a spruce stood looking at them 
Across the wall, as near the wall as they. 
She saw them in their field, they her in hers. 
The difficulty of seeing what stood still, 
Like some up-ended boulder split in two, 
Was in her clouded eyes; they saw no fear there. 
She seemed to think that, two thus, they were safe. 
Then, as if they were something that, though 
strange, 
She could not trouble her mind with too long, 
She sighed and passed unscared along the wall. 
"This, then is all. What more is there to ask?" 
But no, not yet. A snort to bid them wait. 
A buck from round the spruce stood looking at 
them 
Across the wall, as near the wall as they. 
This was an antlered buck of lusty nostril, 
Not the same doe come back into her place. 
He viewed them quizzically with jerks of head, 
As if to ask, "Why don't you make some motion? 
Or give some sign of life? Because you can't. 
I doubt if you're as living as you look." 
Thus till he had them almost feeling dared 
To stretch a proffering hand—and a spell-break­
ing. 
Then he too passed unscared along the wall. 
Two had seen two, whichever side you spoke from. 
"This must be all." It was all. Still they stood, 
A great wave from itgoingoverthem, 
As if the earth in one unlooked-for favor 
Had made them certain earth returned their love. 
(pp. 229-230) 
The situation has a perfection about it; 
the first and last words in the poem are 
love. The couple have a great sympathy 
with nature; the animals are—or seem to 
be—unaware of alien presences. The 
couple even have sufficient sympathy and 
imaginative relationship with nature to 
be playful, to engage in the fantasy of say­
ing "Good night to woods." Significantly, 
such an "unlooked-for favor" as they 
receive can come only to those who already 
believe. Although playful, the couple are 
not especially naive: they are sufficiently 
rational not to court disaster, showing at 
least a latent awareness of potential irony 
in nature as antagonist. Their sigh reveals 
reluctant but realistic resignation to neces­
sity. Accepting reality, they are then sur­
prised by the unexpected, additional 
events which seem special favors. 
The meaning of the events is posited 
from interpretation, as are all meanings, 
and the meaning here is believable because 
in this instance the "design" seems com-
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pelling. The narrator plays the game of 
"as-if," seemingly with them, in inter­
preting the meaning of the deer's actions 
and the great wave of feeling which follow. 
The closing scene seems an epiphany: 
Two had seen two, whichever side you spoke from. 
"This must be all." It was all. Still they stood, 
A great wave from it going over them. 
As if the earth in one unlooked-for favor 
Had made them certain earth returned their love. 
(p. 230) 
All interpretations are "as-if" construc­
tions and are related to fantasy and faith: 
one acknowledges the reality of the outer 
world and one's inability to penetrate it 
completely. This game of interpretation, 
"as-if," is serious play, the only modus 
vivendi possible to humans—play because 
one must interpret to determine meanings, 
and serious because one's "salvation" de­
pends upon the patterns he discerns and 
the values he establishes. By consciously 
acknowledging his "as-if s," he maintains 
his saving grace: he knows he might be 
wrong—the ironic consciousness. The 
interpretation is an "as-if' construction, 
but it is not necessarily not real. It is real 
for them, and neither the narrator nor the 
poet seems critical of their response. Some 
readers think that, with each pair remain­
ing on its own side of the wall, communion 
does not occur, and the epiphany is thus 
not warranted. Communion of the 
Romantic kind, however, is not claimed; 
the poet is claiming something unusual 
has occurred—at least for the couple—in 
"two had seen two, whichever side you 
spoke from." The couple here are capable 
of a trust in the "as-if," and thus they—or 
perhaps only the narrator—come to real­
ize that "happiness makes up in height for 
what it lacks in length" (PRF, p. 333). 
Humans do not experience a constant 
sense of metaphysical transcendence, but 
the imagination which produces these 
epiphanies and the poetry which perpe­
trates them do sustain the human being. 
Poirier's comment on "A Boundless Mo­
ment" is not, as I have indicated, appli­
cable to that poem so much as it is to this 
one: 
Frost is a poet who sets out to prove that nature 
itself wants us to "pretend" while knowing we are 
doing so, that it wants us to believe in something 
without certifying what it should be, and that, in 
its capacities for self-preservation, it offers a 
model for how we might preserve our mythologies 
in poetry. It is a process, to use Frost's own good 
way of describing it in "A Boundless Moment," 
of letting one's "own pretense" deceive. . . . 
This is a poem about "pretending" whenever 
nature gives you any sort of license, apocalyptic 
or redemptive, for doing so. And it is out of such 
moments of illusion or extremity that images 
emerge which belong to and are perpetuated by 
poetry.7 
Frost would agree with Wordsworth that 
a person half perceives, half creates his 
world. With the "as-if" Frost is calling 
attention to what he sees as the essence of 
poetry and its significance to the human 
being. Frost goes so far as to say, "Give us 
immedicable woes—woes that nothing 
can be done for—woes flat and final. And 
then to play. The play's the thing. Play's 
the thing. All virtue is 'as-if'" (SP, p. 67). 
Poetry is made from these immedicable 
woes in the human condition, and the 
poetry (or any accommodation of them) is 
made by the play, the play of mind and 
imagination in interpretating, in positing 
useful "as-if" constructions which may 
even give us bases for action, and, further­
more, some of our action is believing those 
"as-if" constructions into being. Play in­
volves detachment, which can mean per­
spective, even sanity. One can master the 
immedicable woes through the serious 
play of "as-if," through imagination ma­
nipulating the details into a pattern, con­
trolling the outer forces that can be de­
structive, by fitting them into a formal 
structure. They are not then completely 
uncontrolled, chaotic, and destructive; 
one has a perspective on them. Life is 
"played seriously" in this way. This con­
trol by play, by imagination, is the main 
7Poirier, pp. 213-14. 
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effect that Donald Greiner sees in Frost's 
use of irony.8 
WhileFrost, like Wordsworth, believes 
a person half perceives, half creates his 
world, he, like Wordsworth, also em­
phasizes that one should be carefully at­
tentive to the realities, hard facts, of that 
outer world. One's relationship with that 
outer world can incorporate trust—but 
one also knows what he is doing, marrying 
irony with that glorious imagination— 
faith and commitment beyond irony and 
in the face of irony—a perspective which 
allows him to be tough-minded, realistic, 
and still capable of faith. Frost takes a 
hard look at what he sees, and he can be 
objective enough to see much value on 
both sides—reason and imagination, 
common sense and those "passionate pref­
erences" (PRF, p. 467). The opposing 
truths complement each other. One must 
balance his "passionate preferences" with 
his intellectual preferences. Reasonably 
and pragmatically, people simply devise 
the best working balance they can live by 
it, as in metaphor, until it breaks down 
and needs revision. 
Because Frost knows each side has limits 
and is valid only in relation to the other 
side, to its counter-truth, he can play 
with the limits, can engage in whimsy and 
fantasy, knowing their value and truth in 
relation to hard facts. He is not saying that 
whimsy is hard fact, but why should one 
eliminate the fun and the particular effect 
of whimsy? Whimsy is "wrong," as any 
view is "wrong," only when it is pretend­
ing to be its opposite—for instance, 
whimsy parading as realism—or asserting 
that its opposite has no value, that it it­
self is absolute in value and validity. 
While one should not believe in judg­
ments as absolutes, neither should one 
refuse to make them. One sees both the 
difficulty of constructing an order that 
can be believed in—and the necessity for 
doing so. Irony, humor, play—all forms 
"Donald Greiner, "The Use of Irony in Robert Frost," 
South Atlantic Bulletin, 38 (May 1973), 52-60. 
of detachment—may exist—and should 
exist—but without nullifying belief. One 
may live in relativity with a firm center of 
conviction: one may believe with "a most 
knowing eye" (Poe, "Romance"). Frost 
understands belief in what he knows are 
necessarily and necessary "as-if" con­
structions, imaginative constructions. 
A final point: for Frost, form itself en­
hances faith. Creating structures involves 
belief, even depends upon one's believing. 
Whereas the philosophical ironist may 
emphasize form as perhaps a person's only 
certainty and only value worthy in itself, 
Frost counters, "I think [form] must 
stroke faith the right way" (SP, p. 106). 
To him the creation of form is itself a 
c o m m i t m e n t  b e y o n d  i r o n y ,  a  
"believ[ing] the poem into existence" 
(SP, p. 45). Writing a poem demands a 
faith beyond the narrow intellect. In 
that commitment itself, we find his 
justification for a commitment not only 
to structure, which the philosophical 
ironist may accept, but also to belief. 
"Making little poems encourages a man to 
see that there is a shapeliness in the 
world."9 He elaborates this point in some 
detail in "Education by Poetry": 
The person who gets close enough to poetry, he is 
going to know more about the word belief than 
anybody else knows, even in religion nowadays. 
There are two or three places where we know 
belief outside of religion. One of them is at the age 
of fifteen to twenty, in our self-belief. ... In his 
foreknowledge he has something that is going to 
believe itself into fulfilment, into acceptance. 
There is another belief like that, the belief in 
someone else, a relationship of two that is going to 
be believed into fulfillment. . . . That belief can 
fail, of course. 
Then there is a literary belief. Every time a 
poem is written, every time a short story is written, 
it is written not by cunning, but by belief. The 
beauty, the something, the little charm of the 
thing to be, is more felt than known. . . . No one 
who has ever come close to the arts has failed to 
see the difference between things written (me­
chanically), with cunning and device, and the 
kind that are believed into existence, that begin in 
something more felt than known.. .. 
"Quoted by John Ciardi in "Robert Frost: Master Con­
versationalist," Saturdati Review of Literature, 42 (March 
21,1959), 20. 
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Now I think—I happen to think—that those 
three beliefs that I speak of, the self-belief, the 
love-belief, and the art-belief, are all closely 
related to the God-belief . . . the relationship 
we enter into with God to believe the future in— 
to believe the hereafter in. (SP, pp. 44-46) 
Such believing the future into being is the 
most creative act in our lives. Moreover, 
he wrote to Untermeyer, "Belief is better 
than anything else, and it is best when 
rapt, above paying its respects to any­
body's doubt whatsoever. At bottom the 
world isn't a joke."10 Frost's playfulness 
includes this shrewdness about playful­
ness; he sees the irony of the ironic stance; 
he knows that belief is best. The aware­
ness of potential irony, even total doubt 
in philosophical irony, and the affirma­
tion of the imagination are balanced in 
Frost's modern vision. 
10Selected Letters oj Robert Frost, edited by Lawrence 




APPLICATIONS OF PERSPECTIVISM 
TO LITERARY CRITICISM 
LEWIS P. SEGO, Ph.D. 
When I decided on the title, "Applica­
tions of Perspectivism to Literary Criti­
cism," I had anticipated that the ad­
vance article on perspectivism would 
already be in print by the time this ad­
dress came around. However, as many of 
you know, the first time an article is sent 
out it does not always lodge. The ad­
vance article bounced back and had to 
be sent out again. It is therefore not in 
print yet. Before I can deal with literary 
criticism to any advantage from the 
perspective of perspectivism, I must talk 
about the background of the theory and 
the philosophy itself. 
Samuel Taylor Coleridge once pub­
lished in the Morning Post a quatrain 
which said of "The Rhyme of the An­
cient Mariner" what might well be said 
of perspectivism: 
Your poem must eternal be, 
Dear Sir. It cannot fail. 
For 'tis incomprehensible 
And without head or tail. 
Perspectivism is a philosophy growing 
out of a theory of the organization of in­
tellect. "My mind to me a kingdom is," 
wrote Sir Edward Dyer in 1588. Nor did 
he know the truth he spoke. A recent 
book, The Mystery of the Mind,1 by 
Canadian surgeon, Dr. Wilder Penfield, 
presents results of studies of mental func­
tioning during his long career in brain 
surgery on over 3,000 patients. His 
recently published findings lend support 
to the view that dominance of one 
hemisphere of the cerebral cortex over 
the other predisposes some individuals to 
see the forest and miss the trees, while 
others see the trees but never the forest. 
This differentiation remains indepen­
dent of intelligence but sets the stage for 
other cognitive processes. 
How did someone in English, I am fre­
quently asked, become interested in the 
relationships between cognitive pro­
cesses and language and literature? I 
must say that it was a rather freaky acci­
dent that I ran across a student at Bob 
Jones University several years ago whose 
background was quite different from 
mine and whose innate predispositions 
seemed to have been almost diametri­
cally opposed to mine. Hence, we were 
attracted. After leaving Bob Jones Uni­
versity in order to wed this young lady, I 
found that every problem we tackled 
somehow turned inside out for one of us. 
If the problem were to determine how 
many groceries we were going to be able 
to afford for the remainder of the month, 
my wife would very likely subtract and I 
would very likely add. We approached 
almost everything diametrically op­
positely. It became necessary for us to 
ask questions to cope with this seeming 
divergency of mind. In those early days I 
began to suspect that there was some­
thing in the organization of intellect, 
something dating back much earlier in 
our lives, that was influencing our 
1 Wilder Penfield, The Mystery of the Mind: A 
Critical Study of Consciousness and the Human 
Brain (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975). 
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perception. 
Robert and Elizabeth Barrett Brown­
ing had experienced something of a 
similar attraction of opposites. Robert's 
poetry was almost entirely antithetical in 
form, in function, and in essence to that 
of Elizabeth. And yet they were the im­
mortal lovers.2 It seemed that there was 
a compatibility between opposites that 
needed further study. When the time 
came for submitting a proposal for my 
doctoral dissertation, the first thing that 
occurred to me was a study of the 
Brownings, since I was interested in Vic­
torian literature, as well as cognitive 
functions. 
Thus, I combined the two studies and 
conducted an empirical investigation of 
cognitive styles among students studying 
the Browning poetry. The result was a 
startling discovery to me because I 
thought perhaps I was seeing rare in­
stances of the phenomenon, not a pat­
tern that would permeate society. Ap­
proximately fifty percent of the students 
randomly selected from all of the 
freshman English classes at Indiana State 
University turned out to be "field depen­
dent."3 Now, this term is one widely 
used in cognitive study but not so widely 
used in our discipline. "Field 
dependent," to cast it in other terms, is 
basically a sort of Gestalt dependency, a 
dependency on patterns to recognize 
details, a tendency to see the forest first 
and then the trees. About fifty percent of 
the students—and this was quite apart 
from their intellects, quite apart from 
their intelligence quotients—kept seeing 
the trees and missing the forest at first 
and had to work to put the trees together 
to see the forest. They were the "field in­
dependent" people. 
In order to study them further I 
developed an inductive presentation of 
some of Robert Browning's works and a 
deductive presentation of the same 
works and presented those to both types 
of students in a random pattern. There 
was an actual crossing of abilities, so that 
it seemed to indicate that there was a 
tendency, somewhat stable, toward 
dominance of one hemisphere of the 
cerebral cortex over the other. This later 
led to a reconsideration of philosophy. I 
went back and reread Locke, Berkeley, 
Hume, and parts of Kant. I looked again 
at Hegel, reread T. S. Eliot. I decided 
that Socrates had seen both forest and 
trees from afar, that Plato had gotten the 
message and had seen the forest a little 
bit more closely. Aristotle, rejecting the 
basic premise of Plato, took interest in 
the trees and saw them in greater detail. 
Then Jesus came along and synthesized 
the whole thing. From these considera­
tions I had to reconstruct my own 
philosophy. When I finished, I had what 
I termed a pluralistic philosophy called 
"perspectivism." 
Now, if you will allow me to implant 
in your imagination for a moment a 
model that we could use as a visual aid, I 
should like to construct in your mind's 
eye a tetrahedron, or a four-sided 
pyramid including the base as one side, 
built, in other words, of equilateral 
triangles along the sides. Furthermore, I 
should like to construct it of marbles, just 
ordinary agates. I should like to glue 
them together with superglue, starting at 
the base and trying to hold them in place 
in a triangular shape until I could fit 
others in the center and stick them all 
together. 
But, you can already see the problem 
of trying to form a triangle first. It is 
much easier, especially with superglue, 
to stick two or three marbles together in 
the center and build the triangle around 
them. It is easier yet to take one marble 
and stick it to three already stuck 
together lying on the table and create a 
2 Frances Winwar, The Immortal Lovers: 
Elizabeth Barrett and Robert Browning, a Biogra­
phy (New York: Harper, 1950). 
3 Lewis Sego, "The Interactive Effect of Induc­
tive and Deductive Sequences and Cognitive Styles 
on the Acquisition of a Higher Order Concept in 
English Literature" (Diss. Indiana University 
1974). 
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tiny pyramid, and then lift it up, placing 
some others there and pushing them 
together until that other pyramid can 
stick to those, and so build the pyramid 
from the top rather than from the bot­
tom. Now, if you visualize this tetra­
hedron of marbles as composed of four 
equilateral triangles of glass spheres, you 
can see readily that tipping it over makes 
no difference in its appearance. We can 
continue to tip it from one side to the 
next. And, each time we tip it, there is a 
point at the top where one marble rests 
above all others. 
With this visual aid in mind, I should 
like you silently to respond to the ques­
tion, "What is this that I imaginatively 
hold in my hand?" The responses that 
normally come from vocal members of 
an audience range all the way from "a 
pyramid" to "a paperweight." If you 
said a pyramid, you were thinking about 
the form. If you said a tetrahedron, you 
were being more specific about the form. 
If you said a tetrahedron of marbles, you 
were thinking about the essence and the 
form. If you said a tetrahedron of glass 
marbles, you were being even more 
specific about the essence. And if you 
said it was a paperweight, you were 
speaking functionally. If you said it was 
a model presented to our imaginations, 
you were speaking functionally. And if 
you said it was a model made of marbles, 
you were dealing with both function and 
essence. 
This insight began to glow as a new 
concept in my mind in relation to these 
other studies. I began to see as it rested 
on its base, each of the three upright 
facets, a different perspective on which 
we view reality and literature. I began to 
realize that out in the real world, outside 
the ivied walls, most people would have 
reacted to the form first. In fact, it 
would have been almost as if we had 
turned this tetrahedron so that the bot­
tom side, of course, would not be visible, 
and the other two sides would be behind 
with only one facet, the facet of form, 
appearing to the general populace. 
However, some technically trained 
people in a new age—in an age of "how" 
—have turned slightly this pyramid so 
that they can see a bit of the side we call 
function. They see a great deal of the 
form side; they see a little bit of the func­
tional side. But, when they see two sides 
from the front, they cannot see the side 
that is behind. They cannot see the 
essence unless they take a new perspec­
tive. As long as they go around the base 
of such a pyramid, they will see only one 
side at a time; but, if they ever reach the 
top, they can see three sides at once; they 
can see form, function, and essence 
simultaneously. 
I began to think about this analogy in 
relation to exercising critical scholarship. 
If Plato's black horse and white horse in 
the Phaedras had been made a team in­
stead of antagonists, their cooperative 
efforts might have resulted in a new 
discovery for Plato and new strength for 
mankind. And, if one of the horses had 
been male and the other female, not only 
would they have been a powerful team, 
they would have spawned new genera­
tions of powerful teams. Out of such a 
hypothesis has emerged this new plural­
istic philosophy called perspectivism. It 
seeks to establish its solidarity, not on a 
single way of perceiving reality, but on 
multiple but harmonious ways of per­
ception of what is real. Perspectivism, 
like a tetrahedron, can assume a new 
base and a new vortex each time it is 
tipped. The sole criterion for reality, 
therefore, becomes internal consistency, 
a resolution of conflicts, and a har­
monious balance between opposing for­
ces and seemingly opposing points of 
view. Its merit lies in its potential for 
bringing harmony among the perspec­
tives that until now seemed to be an­
tagonists, that until now had not been 
teamed up. A potential new strength for 
mankind could conceivably result. 
Essentially, the philosophy of perspec­
tivism says that the aspects of mankind's 
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dual nature, intellectual and emotional, 
should harmonize and reinforce each 
other, much in the way male and female 
harmonize and reinforce each other. So 
convinced of this premise was Nathanial 
Hawthorne that he said on one account 
that he suspected the unpardonable sin 
was the separation of the head from the 
heart. And now in the midst of scientific 
discoveries about the two hemispheres of 
the cerebral cortex and about their dif­
ferent functioning, one being a logical 
cortex and the other storing exactly the 
same material that is stored in the other 
half but storing it in an entirely different 
way—in not so logical a way, but in an 
intuitive way—we begin to develop a 
hunch that what Plato described as two 
horses was a phenomenon he had sensed 
in his own intellectual development as he 
shifted the emphasis from one hemi­
sphere to the other. 
The intellect, in its analytical plunge 
from some ideal of truth and beauty 
toward the foundations of human ex­
perience, keeping in mind the tetra­
hedron, of course, needs the guiding of 
emotion to bear it up when its feet 
become stone-bruised. John Stuart Mill, 
for example, found that when he spent 
his energies for long periods of time in 
analytical thinking, starting with the top 
marble and going down, breaking things 
into finer and finer parts, he became 
despondent, depressed, for no apparent 
reason. Upon chancing to find Cole­
ridge's poem, "Dejection: an Ode" Mill 
records in his Autobiography that his 
spirit was renewed and his dejection 
lifted at finding sympathetic companion­
ship in the poem. Thereafter, he re­
freshed his emotions periodically by 
turning to literature and the arts where 
he could bring back into balance the 
emotions and the intellect. Similarly, 
Ezra Pound found such elation in his 
synthesizing of experience and his soar­
ing to philosophical heights beyond 
everyday, conventional reality that, had 
it not been for his intellect to keep a tight 
rein on his emotions, he might not have 
been able to remain in the kingdom of 
the sane as long as he did. The dual 
nature seems to function best when 
neither side dominates and when the two 
are not regarded enemies but allies of 
equal rank. 
Functionally, the philosophy of per-
spectivism says that a consistent ontology 
must consist in love, that a consistent 
ethic must consist in harmony, that a 
consistent aesthetic must consist in 
balance, and that a consistent epistemol-
ogy must consist in raw experience. 
Berkeley would say, "sense data." How­
ever, the unique strength of the philoso­
phy lies, once again, in its flexibility, not 
its rigid philosophical system. I think 
Frost would like that. Its ontology can 
also consist in raw experience when its 
epistemology consists in love. We tip the 
tetrahedron. You may have to take that 
down in your notes and think about that 
a bit. We have, in allegorical fashion, 
equated the base of this tetrahedron with 
the individual experiences, myriads of 
individual experiences, over all of the 
sensory channels that have been feeding 
into our cognitive kingdoms for our en­
tire lives. Those are the raw experiences 
from which another kind of ontology 
could develop. 
In other words, the ontology can start 
at the top, or the ontology can start at 
the bottom. Within the Christian per­
spective the epistemology can begin in 
God's love, you see, the beginning of 
wisdom. Or, it can begin in raw ex­
perience. It can begin in the law, which 
for the Apostle Paul became his school­
master to lead him to experiences with 
Christ. In other words, if we hold that 
love is the summum bonum, the philoso­
phy will function for us as long as the 
method of analysis is applied in our quest 
for knowledge, that is, as long as we pro­
ceed from love, wherever that is viewed 
on the tetrahedron, to analyze it into its 
components, proceeding analytically un­
til we have ultimately reached the level 
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of specific experience. 
The relationship between love and 
fear and mental processes holds impor­
tance for our study. Recent brain 
research seems to indicate that fear in­
hibits the free flow of electrical energy 
across the corpus callosum, a network of 
nerves connecting the two hemispheres 
of the brain. When fear comes in, the in­
hibition of those nerve impulses causes 
the brain to shunt down to a lower level 
of operation. Now researchers have 
tested this with electronic probes in open 
brain surgery and found this to be the 
case. Recently in Great Britain an inven­
tor developed a device to put on the 
throat of a stutterer that would generate 
unpredictable tones into headphones to 
block out the sound of the speaker's own 
voice, with instantaneous curing of stut­
tering. Had I not heard this on the BBC 
in a live demonstration, I would have 
doubted it. A stutterer was placed on the 
air and asked to read, and he read, stut­
tering almost every word in the lines. 
The experimenters turned the page, 
placed on his throat the device I have 
described, put the headphones on his 
ears, and had him read another passage. 
He read it without stuttering, without 
faltering a moment, because every time 
he uttered a syllable, the vibration of his 
voice generated an electronic sound 
totally different from his own and 
blocked out the inner transmission of the 
sound of his voice. The experimenters 
concluded that it was fear, fear of the 
reader's own voice, that was producing 
his stuttering. 
The studies are continuing and in­
dicate even further that fear seems to in­
hibit mental processes. Interestingly 
enough, however, love of the agape type 
—even of the filia type but especially of 
the agape type—facilitates mental func­
tioning. A mother or a father in times of 
tremendous stress, when they would nor­
mally be afraid, have been able because 
of love for a child, selfless love for a 
child, to plunge into a burning room and 
bring the child out. So, interestingly, it 
began to occur that perhaps love and 
hate were not the antagonists or the op-
posites, but love and fear. Love tends to 
draw people together; fear tends to draw 
them apart. 
If we hold that raw experience is the 
summum bonum, the philosophy will 
function for us as long as we apply the 
method of synthesis in our quest for 
knowledge, that is, as long as we proceed 
from the base of firsthand experience to 
synthesize the experiences into hypothe­
ses, test those hypotheses, synthesize 
those that will fit together into theories, 
test those theories, synthesize those 
theories that will fit together into laws, 
test those laws, and synthesize those laws 
into truths. With that synthetic process 
at work in the scientific community, we 
have a logical direction in which to pro­
ceed. For, from those laws, presumably, 
ultimately will emerge the truth. It will 
not be the kind of truth that Sherwood 
Anderson talks about in "The Gro­
tesques," the kind of truth that each one 
latches onto and goes off into his own 
corner to contemplate, thus distorting 
his reality. 
To illustrate, let us enlarge our 
tetrahedron in our minds' eyes now— 
and I much prefer imaginary models to 
physical models because in the imagina­
tion we can perform the miracle of 
enlarging a marble tetrahedron into one 
large enough to postulate some in­
teresting relationships on it. If we, in go­
ing toward the top, stop short of the real 
truth, the ultimate truth, and think we 
have it, we become what Anderson calls 
"grotesques." 
It is grotesque to stop short of the 
ultimate truth in our quest, to think that 
because we have arrived at some notion 
that fits everything that is below it, we 
have reached the top. If we let one mar­
ble along the side represent the top of a 
smaller tetrahedron and all the addi­
tional marbles we peal away, if that 
were possible, we might be deluded into 
17 
thinking that we had them all—that we 
had all our marbles. We would still have 
a tetrahedron, only this time a smaller 
one. Perhaps our cognitive realities are 
too small. Perhaps our literary criticism 
partakes of this smallness, this grotesque-
ness. 
The philosophy assumes that the 
ultimate law will be the law of love, 
perhaps a love that is so far beyond any 
that we have ever experienced as to 
amaze us. Thus, a harmonious whole 
will pervade the system to provide 
stability and direction to the further in­
terpretation of experience. More specifi­
cally, the analyst cannot properly pro­
ceed from a close scrutiny of a single ex­
perience without risking a hasty general­
ization. If, however, the analyst wishes 
to proceed in building his philosophy 
from a starting point of faith, he must 
begin with the assumption that there is 
some ultimate reality, some supreme 
truth, some universal beauty, perhaps a 
god or deity of some kind, I submit. 
From such a starting point, the analyst 
need only test subsequent parts of his 
system by the test of harmony. If the new 
parts harmonize with the previous struc­
ture, the new parts have validity and can 
be safely incorporated into the philo­
sophical system. 
The ancient Greeks began with the 
concept of love analyzed into three sub-
concepts: eros, the physical, animal form 
of love; philia, the mental or brotherly 
form of love; and agape, the spiritual or 
selfless form of love, perhaps the full 
measure of which we have not yet at­
tained. This emotion seems to harmonize 
both intellect and emotion and to pro­
duce not only internal harmony, har­
mony within the individual human be­
ing, but harmony between individuals 
and between groups of individuals, no 
matter what other differences may exist. 
A NASA physicist has just recently 
published a book in which he postulates 
the theory that photons are being given 
off and received by every atom in the 
universe—in a random pattern unless in 
some way directed—and that photons 
may be the means by which matter and, 
he says, "if there is spirit," spirit may 
communicate.4 There is one problem 
with photons, philosophically and physi­
cally: unless they are traveling at 
precisely 186,000 miles per second, we 
cannot detect them. If they are going 
faster, they cease to be detectable and, 
therefore, for all we know, cease to exist. 
If they go more slowly they are 
nondetectable and, therefore, for prac­
tical purposes, cease to exist. He is 
speculating that the photon may be the 
next item of study in physics along with 
the neutrino, the particle that is smaller 
than the neutron, electron, and proton. 
If the energy that we know love can 
produce releases photons from the brain, 
it may account for the facilitation that I 
was describing along the corpus cal-
losum connecting the two cerebral 
hemispheres. It may even give scientific 
credence to what Nathaniel Hawthorne 
had to say about the unpardonable sin, 
that we dehumanize ourselves and put 
ourselves off from divine love when we 
separate the heart from the head. Such 
harmony and balance in perspectivism 
is, I think, an important aspect of the 
philosophy, by which we can test good 
literature from bad literature. 
The synthesist, unlike the analyst, 
cannot properly proceed from the as­
sumption of faith in some preconceived 
notion of truth, beauty, or deity. To pro­
ceed synthetically from the top marble, 
to proceed synthetically from such an 
assumption, risks moving into existen­
tialism and ultimately into nihilism. In 
other words, if we start synthesizing 
when we are standing on the top marble, 
we are in nihilism. We can synthesize as 
long as we are down on the ground of 
raw experience. We can analyze when 
we are at the top. If, however, the syn-
4 Adrian Clark, Psycho-kinesis: Moving Matter 
with the Mind (West Nyack, N.Y.: Parker 
Publishing Company, 1973), p. 112. 
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thesist wishes to build a harmonious 
coherent system, he must begin with per­
sonal experience, carefully observed and 
paired with similar personal experiences 
to construct a hypothesis. The hypothesis 
must be tested because individual ex­
perience is subject to individual inter­
pretation. About fifty percent of what 
we see occurs in the mind. A blind man 
was running along a campus sidewalk a 
few days ago, his cane snapping back 
and forth in rapid succession from the 
walls of the buildings to the concrete 
pavement. Though sightless, he was run­
ning with confidence. He had developed 
such a keen sense of hearing that he was 
reconstructing in his mind's eye the pic­
ture of that entire pavement far enough 
in advance to make rapid steps without 
stumbling. Everything he saw occurred 
in his mind. To avoid the distortion of 
subjective vision, we must test our 
hypotheses and join them with other 
tested hypotheses that can be used to 
form a theory. The theory must be har­
monized or synthesized with other 
theories to form laws; and this, fellow 
students of literature, I believe, is where 
we need to begin in forming some sound 
direction in studying language and 
literature. We need to start with these 
fundamentals and start forming hypoth­
eses about these fundamentals, testing 
them and comparing them with similar 
ones to create theories and then test those 
theories to find similarities among theo­
ries to create laws of language and 
literature. Then we may be able to get 
somewhere. This is the way the hard 
scientists have gone about selling their 
subjectivity. Once the laws have been 
synthesized or harmonized, a supreme 
law should emerge, maybe not in our 
lifetime. This law should be one's sum-
mum bonum, one's truth, one's beauty, 
or if you will, one's deity. 
We have looked at perspective essen­
tially; we have looked at it functionally; 
now we shall look at it formally. Formal­
ly, the philosophy of perspectivism says 
that both the idealist and the realist are 
right, each being right for whoever 
thinks he is right. Yet, the restriction 
placed on each becomes one of in­
vestigatory method. The idealist must 
conduct his investigations of reality 
deductively, analytically. The realist, 
contrarily, must conduct his investiga­
tions of reality inductively, synthetical­
ly. Either method will result in a 
satisfactory cognitive structure provided 
harmony becomes the test of validity and 
provided the deducer starts with the 
truth he believes in and the inducer 
starts with an experience or experiment 
in the validity of which he has a high 
degree of confidence. This constitutes 
perspectivism's formal epistemology— 
simple, direct, and tailored to the in­
dividual's own perspective. Pirandello 
expressed it in his play, "Right You Are if 
You Think You Are." 
If, to return to our analogy, we imag­
ine the topmost sphere of the tetra­
hedron to be the summum bonum and 
the base to be raw experience, we can 
readily see that to analyze we would pro­
ceed downward and that to synthesize 
we would proceed upward. The deduc­
tive approach of the idealist would lead 
us downward from the summum bonum 
toward basal experience, so that we 
could begin to interpret our experiences, 
so that they would not be so widely 
divergent from one to another. From 
such organized experience we could in­
terpret the experience that writers incor­
porate into characters. This interpreta­
tion would enable us to test the quality 
of character, to see whether the charac­
ter is a full-blown lifelike character, con­
sistent and logical and feeling, or 
whether he is a half-baked grotesque. 
The inductive approach of the realist 
would lead us upward from basal ex­
perience toward the summum bonum. 
Each approach would produce an in­
tegrated view of reality that would be 
stable even if tipped to a new perspec­
tive. If, for example, our perspective 
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should be formal, as opposed to func­
tional or essential, the approach, induc­
tive or deductive, would remain con­
stant, even if the perspective were tipped 
to the functional or tipped to the 
perspective of the essence of things. Fur­
thermore, we could conceivably shift our 
perspective at will without becoming 
disoriented. 
Using the models of the tetrahedron or 
the pyramid to express the relationship 
of perspectivism to two other major 
philosophical systems of the modern age, 
we might view the pragmatic philosophy 
as a basement dug under the base line of 
raw experience, into which the pyramid 
will tumble when the digging is carried 
to its logical extremes. We might view 
the existentialist philosophy as a needle-
sharp antenna rising from the top of a 
pyramid into nothingness or nihilism, 
from which the only logical course of ac­
tion is suicide, as Ernest Hemingway 
concluded several years ago. John Dew­
ey, at the opposite extreme, turned his 
analytical method on base experience. 
Starting with Berkeley's sensory data, 
Dewey began to deduce the elements in 
that experience that he believed were 
essential to education and ultimately 
knowledge. He was deducing, starting at 
the base of the pyramid. He found the 
system of thought not very stable. In 
fact, he decided the only constant was 
change, an illogical posture in which to 
find oneself, seeing that that constant 
would also be subject to change. 
Paul Tillich and Jean Paul Sartre, on 
the other extreme, started with the con­
cept of a summum bonum and began to 
employ the inductive process to in­
vestigate upward from the top of the 
pyramid, only to find themselves rising 
to a level of meaninglessness. Paul 
Tillich, however, unlike Sartre, decided 
that the meaning must therefore reside 
in God, in whom we exist and of whom 
we consist; thus, he returned to the top 
of the tetrahedron to the summum 
bonum. Much of modern theology seems 
n 
to spin off the needle-sharp pinnacle of 
the existentialist antenna atop the pyra­
mid, as much of modern science seems to 
employ analysis below the level of 
human experience and thus seems to 
undermine the foundations on which the 
pyramid rests. 
Ethically, perspectivism tests every act 
or decision by the simple test of balance 
or harmony. If an act does not produce 
disharmony either within the individual 
or between the individual and other in­
dividuals, it is deemed good. This test 
may be applied with equal force to 
larger segments of society or political 
units, or, I submit to you, to literary 
studies. Often it results in the simple ex­
pedient of a refraining for love. The 
same test may be applied to a work of 
art, to a piece of literature, to determine 
aesthetic values. If there is harmony, in 
form, in function, and in essence, there 
is beauty. As John Keats said in his im­
mortal "Ode on a Grecian Urn," "Beauty 
is truth, truth beauty—that is all / Ye 
know on earth, and all ye need to 
know." 
In summary, perspectivism affords a 
fresh perspective on what is real and sug­
gests something of the subjective nature 
of verifiable reality. In attempting to 
harmonize seemingly irreconcilable dif­
ferences, the new philosophy conforms 
to the function of the two semicircular 
canals in the inner ear that serve as our 
sixth sense, the kinesthetic-kinetic sense, 
the sense of balance and sense of motion 
or harmony. The new philosophy re­
moves the individual ego from an 
"I/thou" relationship to a "we" relation­
ship, in which we all share individual 
differences without one person's being 
superior to another. In such a spirit of 
togetherness and cooperation, even ge­
nial criticism, perhaps true harmony can 
be realized or idealized in the world of 
tomorrow. 
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